Legal Malpractice

ARDC Panel Recommends Suspension of Attorney who Mishandled Clients' Property

An Illinois ARDC Hearing Board Panel slapped a Springfield attorney with a recommendation that she be suspended for at least one year due to her mishandling of client funds.  Specifically, this Springfield attorney was retained in 2016 by a client to help modify a child custody order and was provided a $1,500 retainer.  The attorney deposited these funds in her business account instead of a separate client trust account.  The client asked the attorney on several occasions for a detailed billing statement and update on the case. But, the attorney failed to respond to these requests.  Ultimately, the attorney was fired and failed to return the retainer to the client. 

Similarly, in another matter, the attorney was retained to help modify a visitation and custody order and was paid an advanced fee of $1,500.  The attorney deposited these funds in her business account opposed to a client trust account again.  The panel commented in its report, “[i]t is disturbing that an attorney who has practiced law for more than 30 years and has represented ‘many clients’ has never recognized her need for a client trust account or recognized that the advance payment for fees, such as those made by [these clients] must be deposited into a trust account.”

The hearing board panel also found that the attorney violated Rule 8.4(c) because she lied under oath that she returned the $1,500 retainer to the client in the 2016 matter.  The matter is In re Babette Pauline Salus, 16 PR 127.

Alex Passo and the Paterson Law Firm, LLC handle legal malpractice actions throughout Illinois and Indiana.  If you have a legal malpractice case that you would like to discuss with Alex, you can reach him at (312) 750-1820 or apasso@pattersonlawfirm.com.

Attorney Escapes Legal Malpractice Claim Due to No Actual Knowledge that his Partner Stole Funds from Client

The Court of Appeals of Indiana recently affirmed a trial court’s order granting summary judgment for a defendant attorney in a legal malpractice case. The basis for the summary judgment order was that there was no question of fact of whether the attorney deviated from the standard of care.  The case was an offshoot of a progeny of cases that arose from the theft and deceit committed by former Indianapolis attorney, William Conour (“Conour”).  In this instance, one of Conour’s clients sued his former colleague, Timothy Devereux (“Devereux”), for failing to notify her that there were potentially red flags of the handling of her personal injury settlement proceeds by Conour.

In the case, Rene DiBenedetto v. Devereux, DiBenedetto was involved in a head-on collision in 2010. 2017 Ind. App. LEXIS 274 (Ind. App. 2017).  She subsequently engaged Conour to handled the claims. Early in the following year, Conour settled DiBenedetto’s claim against the tortfeasor and their insurance company for $50,000.  However, the release preserved DiBenedetto’s right to bring a claim under her insurance policy for Underinsured Motorist (UIM) coverage.

In 2011, when Conour was out of the office, DiBenedetto and her father visited the law office on an unscheduled visit and inquired about the status of the case.  Devereux had not been handling the matter; but, checked the on the status of the case with a paralegal and reviewed the entries on firm’s case management program.  He then became aware that a check was cut for $50,000 by the tortfeasor’s insurance company and that DiBenedetto’s medical liens were just shy of $35,000.  He then explained that despite the check being over the medical liens, it was typical in cases such as this one that there not be a disbursement until all of the liens were settled.  He then instructed DiBenedetto to follow-up with Conour about the status of the case.

Later in 2011, DiBenedetto’s UIM claim was settled; but, once again, she never received any of the proceeds.  Devereux resigned from the law firm during this time period due to his concerns about Conour’s actions.  In 2012, Conour was charged with stealing millions of dollars from his clients, including DiBenedetto, and ultimately plead guilty in 2013.

DiBenedetto subsequently brought a legal malpractice claim against Devereux alleging that he breached his duty to her by not providing accurate information relating to her settlement proceeds.  Devereux argued that it was common practice for personal injury attorneys to hold money in trust while settling underinsurance claims.  Therefore, he had no reason to suspect at the time that there was any misdoing by Conour. The trial court was persuaded by this explanation and granted summary judgment.

Thereafter, DiBenedetto appealed, arguing that there was a question of fact, because she introduced an affidavit from an attorney that Devereux deviated from the standard of care.  In the affidavit, the attorney stated Devereux “should have taken some actions to protect [her] by investigating further” since he knew that the funds had not been disbursed for several months.  However, a split appellate court affirmed summary judgment, holding that Devereux had a duty to provide accurate information, and he provided it in this instance.  Therefore, there was no deviation, and summary judgment was appropriate.

Alex Passo and the Patterson Law Firm, LLC handle legal malpractice actions throughout Illinois and Indiana.  If you have a legal malpractice case that you would like to discuss with Alex, you can reach him at 312-750-1820 or apasso@pattersonlawfirm.com.

ARDC Recommends Suspension of Lawyer Due to His Repeated Failure to Attend Court Hearings

Under Rule 1.3 of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct, attorneys have a duty to act with reasonable diligence in the representation of their clients.  It should go without being said; but, once an attorney files their appearance in a matter, they must attend the hearings that are set for the case.  Recently, the ARDC Hearing Board considered whether an attorney committed professional misconduct by neglecting to appear in over six court hearings in an eviction defense case that he was handling.

As a result of the attorney’s failure to diligently defend the case, the ARDC sent the attorney an inquiry letter and subpoena.  The attorney then made a critical mistake in how to handle ethic’s complaints by behaving like an ostrich and ignoring the inquiry and subpoena.  Due to his silence in the proceedings, the ARDC Board recommended that the attorney be suspended for a year and until further order of the Court.

Alex Passo and the Patterson Law Firm, LLC have experience in defending ARDC inquiries and prosecuting legal malpractice actions.  If you have any questions, you can reach Alex at (312) 750-1820 or apasso@pattersonlawfirm.com.

 

 

Gary Attorney Arrested for Theft of Client Funds

Attorneys are oftentimes entrusted with handling their clients’ funds.  One of the most egregious breaches of our code of professional conduct is when an attorney intentionally misappropriates client funds.  Unfortunately, it does occur.

On June 19, 2017, the Indiana State Police arrested Gary attorney Ruth Batey for allegedly stealing her clients’ funds.  The Police state that Batey settled a personal injury case on the behalf of two Gary police officers that were involved in a car crash.  However, she never notified the police offices that she settled the case and kept the proceeds.

Alex Passo and the Patterson Law Firm, LLC have experience handling legal malpractice actions throughout Illinois and Indiana.  If you have a legal malpractice matter, you may reach Alex Passo at (312) 750-1820 or apasso@pattersonlawfirm.com

A Quick Lesson on the Importance of Disclosing Experts Properly

Failing to properly disclose experts can produce a devastating result. In most complex cases, an expert is necessary in order to establish all of the elements of a claim.  By failing to adequately disclose an expert, you risk having expert testimony or opinions barred at trial or in opposition to dispositive motions.

For example, in Cripe v. Henkel Corp., the 7th Circuit recently affirmed a summary judgment ruling in a product liability action where the plaintiff failed to produce expert proof of causation.  2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 10103 (7th Cir. 2017).  In the case, the Plaintiff alleged that he suffered neurological issues due to inhaling glue fumes that contained methylene diphenyl diisocyanate (“MDI”), which was manufactured by his employer.  After three years of discovery, the defendants moved for summary judgment and argued that the MDI could not cause the Plaintiff’s health issues.  Therefore, they should be entitled to summary judgment because the Plaintiff failed to establish any proximate cause from the chemical to the illness.

Judge Simon of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Indiana granted the motion for summary judgment finding that the Plaintiff did not produce any expert proof of causation linking MDI to the symptoms the Plaintiff experienced.  In opposition, the Plaintiff only pointed to his treating physicians that he disclosed in his Rule 26 initial disclosures.  However, the 7th Circuit rejected this argument because the Plaintiff failed to disclose the physicians as experts under 26(a)(2)(A), and, more importantly, failed to provide the items listed under the Rule.  The 7th Circuit explained that “[l]itigants should not have to guess who will offer expert testimony; they need knowledge to conduct their own discovery and proffer responsive experts.  That’s why the failure to comply with Rule 26(a)(2)(A) leads to the exclusion of expert testimony by a witness not identified as an expert. 

Indiana Court of Appeals Reinstates Missed Statute of Limitations Legal Malpractice Claim

One reason legal malpractice cases are difficult to prosecute is due to having to prove the underlying case on top of the attorney’s negligence.  Defendants commonly argue that despite their negligence, they did not cause the plaintiff any injury because the plaintiff would not have prevailed in their underlying case anyway.  Essentially attacking the third element of professional negligence actions – proximate cause.  This type of defense strategy was employed in Roumbos v. Vazanellis. 2017 Ind. App. LEXIS 83 (Ind. App. Ct. 2017).

There, the plaintiff in 2011 was visiting her husband at a hospital and tripped over wires that ran flush along the floor, which resulted in a severe injury.  She hired defendants to file a negligence claim against the hospital; but, they failed to file the claim within the applicable statute of limitations period.  Afterwards, the plaintiff filed a legal malpractice action against the Defendants due to their failure to file within the required period of time.

Defendants moved for summary judgment in 2016 based upon the supposed inability to win the underlying case.  During her deposition, the plaintiff acknowledged that she knew of the wires existence and consciously avoided them because she knew if she stepped on them there was the possibility that she could have fallen.  Additionally, she testified that the day that she fell, she had not looked down at where the wires were located and, if she had done so, she probably would have seen the wires and avoided them.  Based on these statements, the trial court granted summary judgment reasoning that the plaintiff was aware of the dangerous condition. 

But, the Indiana Court of Appeals reversed this decision because the trial court did not consider the entirety of Section 343 Restatement (Second) of Torts when reaching its decision.  Rather, qualifying circumstances exist under Section 343(a)(1) where a landowner may be liable for an invitee’s injury despite their knowledge or the obviousness of a dangerous condition. In such cases, the landowner is not relieved of the duty of reasonable care that it owes to the invitee for their protection.  The Court relied upon an illustration in the Restatement to reach its conclusion.  In the illustration, an invitee was aware of an open and obvious condition but forgets about and it and is injured.  Despite being aware of the condition, under this illustration the landlord was nevertheless still liable because the it could reasonably anticipate the event.  Consequently, the Indiana Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

Alex Passo and the Patterson Law Firm, LLC handle legal malpractice actions throughout Illinois and Indiana.  Alex can be reached at (312) 750-1820 or apasso@pattersonlawfirm.com.

Statute of Repose Bars $1 Million Dollar Legal Malpractice Claim

In Damor America v. Henry Gonzalez, 2016 IL App. (1st) 143685-U (1st Dist. 2016), the First District Appellate Court of Illinois held that the Plaintiff brought its legal malpractice action late against their former attorneys and, therefore, the claim was barred.  In the underlying case, Plaintiff retained the Defendants to bring an action against a shipping company that had damaged $1.3 million worth of Plaintiff’s pharmaceutical goods.  However, Defendants botched the case due to failing to review the relevant shipping agreement terms.

Defendants filed the Plaintiff’s claim in the wrong jurisdiction and it became untimely as a result.  The shipping agreement stated that claims had to be filed within one year of the loss of cargo in England’s High Court of Justice.  The loss occurred in February 2005 and, the Defendants filed the claim in February 2006 in federal court in New York City.

After filing, the shipping company raised this issue as an affirmative defense.  In 2006, the claim was settled for $20,000 in part because of the affirmative defense and, additionally, because the Defendants advised the Plaintiff that $20,000 was the shipping company’s insurance policy limit.  But, instead, after Plaintiff’s subsequent review of the shipping agreement, it found that the shipment was covered for $1,205,000.

After learning about these provisions in the shipping agreement, Plaintiff sued their former attorneys in April 2014.  Plaintiff alleged in its legal malpractice suit that it would have never settled the underlying case if it had known about the potential $1.2 million in coverage and other relevant provisions in the shipping agreement.  However, Defendants argued that Plaintiff failed to timely file the claim and, therefore, the claim was barred by the two-year and six-year statutes of limitations and repose.  In rebuttal, the Plaintiff alleged that the statutes were not applicable because the Defendants had fraudulently concealed their legal malpractice by failing to provide Plaintiff its file (by stating it was destroyed) and, attempting to mislead the Plaintiff by providing mischaracterizations of facts.  However, the court ultimately concluded that the legal malpractice claim was filed untimely and, the Plaintiff’s claim did not meet the standards of fraudulent concealment.

 

Alex Passo and the Patterson Law Firm frequently handle legal malpractice actions.  If you have a potential claim you may contact me at: 312-750-1820 or apasso@pattersonlawfirm.com.

Legal Malpractice Judgment Could Not Be Discharged in Bankruptcy

In Jahrling v. Estate of Stanley Cora, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed that a judgment entered against an attorney in a previous legal malpractice case could not be discharged in his subsequent bankruptcy proceeding.  In the underlying case, the attorney represented an individual who only spoke polish in the sale of his home.  The attorney did not speak polish; therefore, there was a significant language barrier between the two during the transaction.

The home was valued at $106,000, but it only sold for $35,000.  The buyer subsequently flipped the house for $145,000.  The individual may have sold the house under value because he believed the purchase agreement included a clause that allowed him to live in an upstairs room of the home for the rest of his life.  However, the contract the attorney provided him contained no such provision.

The individual thereafter sued his attorney for legal malpractice and a judgment was entered against him.  Then, the attorney filed for bankruptcy and listed the judgment as a debt that he sought to discharge. 

The bankruptcy court, and later, the Seventh Circuit, found that the judgment could not be discharged due to the attorney’s defalcation of duties.  Under the U.S. Bankruptcy code, defalcation is an exception to discharge of a debt.  Defalcation occurs when the debtor with knowledge acts in a reckless manner in respect to their fiduciary responsibilities.  Here, the courts found that the attorney recklessly breached his standard of care by representing an individual who did not speak the same language and, relied upon only opposing counsel to act as an interpreter.